Rights and Remedies in the Federal District Courts of Mexico and the United States by Schwarz, Carl E.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 4
Number 1 Winter 1977 Article 3
1-1-1977
Rights and Remedies in the Federal District Courts
of Mexico and the United States
Carl E. Schwarz
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carl E. Schwarz, Rights and Remedies in the Federal District Courts of Mexico and the United States, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 67 (1977).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol4/iss1/3
Rights and Remedies in the
Federal District Courts of Mexico
and the United States
By CARL E. SCHWARZ*
The federal judicial power of Mexico is. .. the custodian of the con-
stitution by way of the writ of Amparo, as much in matters of legality as
in the constitutionality of the acts of all authorities, state and federal, thus
making possible the State of law in which we live.
-- Speech delivered by the president of the Mexican Supreme
Court (October 9, 1974)
The Amparo Must Not Be Used As A Screen To Violate The Law
-Headline in El Mexicano (San
Luis, Sonora, Mexico, June 17, 1975)
Introduction
As the intermediaries between pure constitutionalism and raw politics,
the federal courts of both Mexico and the United States struggle to protect
individual constitutional rights and to maintain their own independence. In
both countries, the federal district courts are in the forefront of that struggle.
In the United States it has been said that federal district courts are the
"decisional building blocks"' and "the basic points of input"2 for the
federal judicial system; the judges of some of these courts have been dubbed
the "fifty-eight lonely men,' '3 and their composite, "the lonesomest man in
* Professor of Political Science, Fullerton College at Fullerton, California.
The author is indebted to Professors Stanley Anderson, Thomas Schrock, C. Herman
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son of the American Council on Education; Dr. Stephen Wasby, Southern Illinois Univer-
sity; Professor Sid Kushner, Edinboro St. College, Pa.; and Dr. Aaron Segel, National
Science Foundation, for their ideas and criticisms; to Professor Hector Fix Zamudio, In-
stituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico, for his
writings and encouragement; to the Political Science Department, University of California,
Santa Barbara, and Ms. Michele Monahan for their research assistance; and to the Insti-
tute of Governmental Studies, Berkeley, California, for its initial encouragement and
"seed money."
1. R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 80 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON & VINES].
2. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYS-
TEM 25 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE].
3. J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961) [hereinafter cited as
PELTASON].
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town." 4 On the other hand, in the towns and outlying areas of Mexico, the
locations of the district courts-usually near the bustle of the market
plazas-prevent the loneliness that many judges might prefer after abrasive
contacts with politics. Moreover, Mexican district judges, unlike their coun-
terparts in the United States, tend to have more intense legal, social, and
physical contact with the populace. They not only hear all ordinary civil and
criminal cases triable under federal law, but they also must dispose of
constitutional grievances.
Located in the federal capital and in forty-one other cities and towns
throughout the country, the sixty-three district judges in Mexico decide the
vast majority of all citizen complaints concerning official abuses of authority
brought under the federal constitution. This is done almost exclusively
through their jurisdiction under the all-purpose constitutional writ, the am-
paro.' Mexican district judges are the first to receive petitions attacking the
constitutionality of statutes, administrative regulations, and decrees of the
President of the Republic. 6 The broad jurisdiction and diverse remedies
available to these judges make possible not only a great deal of judicial
intervention in the national political process, but also the consideration and
perhaps resolution of national political questions "within the local environ-
ments in which they are generated." ' In the vast majority of the cases these
judges decide, however, they serve as judicial ombudsmen, interceding on
behalf of the common citizen against the daily, almost anonymous abuse and
harrassment of these citizens at the hands of officialdom.
Comparative political scientists, historians, lawyers, and other scholars
have generally ignored or scanted the political role of national constitutional
courts in developing and transitional societies.' This neglect is particularly
4. Grafton, Lonesomest Man in Town, COLLIER'S, April 29, 1950, at 20.
5. Meaning "protection," "refuge," or "sequestration." CASSELL'S SPANISH
DICTIONARY 61 (1960).
6. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS IEXICANOS (Constitu-
tion) arts. 103, 104, 107 (Mexico) [hereinafter cited as MEX. CONST.]; LAW OF AM-
PARO arts. 114(I), 73 (VI).
7. RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 1, at 83.
8. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 438-52 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as ABRAHAM]. Abraham's otherwise excellent fifteen-page bibliography on "com-
parative constitutional and administrative law" contains barely two dozen titles devoted in
whole or in substantial part to the legal systems of Latin America. Africa, the Middle
East or southern Asia; still fewer of these are thorough comparative studies.
On the other hand, some scholars, in the United States and elsewhere, have begun to
penetrate this void. See, e.g., A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICUL-
TURAL WORLD (1971); M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPO-
RARY WORLD (1971); Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 685 (1976); Kommers, Political Impact of Constitutional
Courts, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 953 (1974).
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lamentable in view of the variety of Latin American legal systems and
judicial processes, which in many cases antedate those of the United States
and Canada.9 Too often, Anglo-American and European scholars assume
that the personal style of leadership prevalent in Latin America precludes an
independent and libertarian judiciary. It is assumed that no judge can either
thwart a course of action to which the regime is committed, or effectively
intervene when politically sensitive issues are at stake. In sum, the argument
goes, the Latin American judiciary must be a farce.
Though Anglo-American literature seldom refers to the higher courts of
Latin America, it even less frequently mentions the functions of the Latin
American trial courts. This comes as no surprise to those acquainted with
the relative dearth, until recently, of scholarship on the lower federal and
state courts of industrialized nations, including the United States.10
This article attempts to estimate the success of federal district judges in
Mexico in protecting the constitutional rights of individual litigants. The
comparative reference for evaluating this success is the performance of
district court judges in the United States. This format necessitates a prelimi-
nary consideration of the role and performance of these trial courts as part of
their respective overall constitutional rights systems. Thus, the first section
of this article consists of a comparison of the entire amparo process and the
structure of the Mexican federal judiciary with their United States counter-
parts. The focus is on the jurisdiction, procedure, and effects of selected
remedies at the trial and appellate levels.
Judicial performance in federal constitutional rights cases is compara-
tively measured and analyzed in the last two sections by two criteria: (1) the
9. A list of textbooks on Latin American politics and government having only a
brief mention of courts, key legal factors, and constitutional law would be too numerous
to list here. Most of the textbooks reviewed by this writer, some twenty in all, contained
scattered references to legal or judicial topics, but no systematic treatment either topically
or on a country-by-country basis. But see T. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL PoL1-
Ics: THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONINGS OF COURTS (1970) [hereinafter cited as
BECKER]. This is an analysis of the dearth of proper methodology and coverage in the
area of comparative judicial processes, with frequent reference to Latin America and de-
veloping areas. See also K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA (1974); Wiarda, Law and Political Development in Latin America, 19
AM. J. COMP. L. 434 (1971).
10. With respect to United States federal trial and appellate courts, see GOLDMAN
& JAHNIGE, supra note 2; PELTASON, supra note 3; RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note
1. I would thus echo the statement of Theodore Becker (only with particular reference to
the lower courts) that "what must be measured is the relationship between comparable
actions of judicial independence and judicial review over time and across cultures ....
There are definite signs that there is greater exercise in some of those [Latin American]
countries than the more pessimistic might lead us to believe." BECKER, supra note 9, at
215-16.
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extent to which the federal trial courts in each country are accessible to those
with complaints against government officials, and (2) how often the judges
actually decide in favor of those claims. These twin standards of judicial
effectiveness can be partially tested by referring to (1) the litigation rate-
the number of filings per 100,000 population; (2) the types of constitutional
rights petitions processed through the federal district courts; (3) the socio-
economic backgrounds of the petitioners; and (4) the percentage, number,
and subject matter of district court decisions against the government. The
latter measurement involves plaintiff win-loss ratios in all amparo subject
matter areas-criminal, civil, labor, and administrative-as compared to
equivalent ratios in United States federal habeas corpus and Civil Rights Act
proceedings.11 Another variable, procedural economy in the processing of
complaints, is discussed as a function of judicial accessibility in sections II
and III.
I. The Uniqueness of the Mexican Amparo
Writ and Constitutional Rights Remedies
in the United States: Jurisdiction,
Procedure, and Effects
A. The Mexican Court System
Mexico, like the United States, has a two-tiered judicial system. The
federal courts hear cases arising under the Constitution, statutes, and treaties
of the nation, while state tribunals entertain cases and controversies involv-
ing local law and constitutional provisions." Both constitutions also enun-
ciate essentially the same criteria of eligibility for federal judicial review:
cases involving foreign diplomats, the federal government and its subdivi-
sions, citizens from different states" and foreign nations, and governments
of different states as parties to the litigation. 1
4
In civil law disputes the Mexican federal trial courts share jurisdiction
with state tribunals. Article 104(I) of the Mexican Constitution grants con-
current review in cases involving enforcement of federal statutes and inter-
national treaties affecting the legal interests of private persons. Questions of
constitutional rights are brought almost exclusively under the amparo writ.
11. By Civil Rights Act proceedings, I refer to those actions brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
12. U.S. CONST. art. III; MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 104.
13. The United States further limits federal jurisdiction in most civil actions be-
tween citizens of different states to cases where the amount in controversy is more than
$10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
14. U.S. CONST. art. III; MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 104.
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Thus, a separate appellate process to handle amparo cases has developed out
of the federal judicial monopoly over such proceedings. At the base of this
hierarchy are the sixty-three federal district courts possessing original juris-
diction over ordinary controversies involving federal law as well as viola-
tions of constitutional rights challenged through the indirect amparo. In the
latter case, the petitioner may appeal unfavorable district court judgments
either to one of the seventeen collegiate circuit courts throughout the major
cities of the nation, or to the appropriate five-member chamber of the Su-
preme Court; that is, to the penal, administrative, civil, or labor chamber.
Those failing to win the ordinary appeal available in the state or federal
judicial systems may bring a direct amparo to either of the two amparo
appellate courts just mentioned. The jurisdictional dividing line between the
collegiate tribunals and the Supreme Court is determined by criteria con-
tained in the 1968 amparo reforms, such as the type and length of sentence
(criminal cases), amounts in controversy (civil and administrative cases),
the degree of "public" or "collective" interest at stake (administrative,
civil, and labor cases) and whether the offending official or agency is federal
or state (all four subject matter areas). The Supreme Court as a whole
(plenary Supreme Court) meets once a week to decide on "constitutionality
amparos."
The unitary circuit courts, on the other hand, exist exclusively for
handling appeals from judgments of the district courts in ordinary civil and
criminal controversies involving federal regulations and statutes. There are
ten such circuit courts, and like the collegiate circuit tribunals they are
strategically located in major cities throughout the country.
B. General Characteristics of the Amparo Writ
The all-purpose writ of amparo is widely regarded by Mexicans and
foreign legal scholars as Mexico's most effective deterrent to abuse at all
levels of government. Issuance of the writ is the exclusive province of the
federal judiciary with the exception of certain emergency situations in which
a state judge may be called on a temporary and very limited basis.15
First adopted by the national Congress in 1849, the amparo has
antecedents in both the civil codes of the Roman Empire, France, and Spain,
and the Anglo-American common law injunction and writs of habeas corpus
and certiorari.'" At the turn of the century, in fact, a great debate raged
15. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 38-40, 144; H. FIx ZAMUDIO, EL JUICIO DE AM-
PARO 386 (1964) [hereinafter cited as ZAMUDiO, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO].
16. See I. BURGOA, EL JUiCIO DE AMPARO 41-92 (6th ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as BURGOA]; Speech by Margain, Antecedentes Historicos de la Libertad Constitu-
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between renowned amparo scholars Ignacio Vallarta and Emilio Rabasa
over the degree to which the writ of habeas corpus in the United States
inspired the authority of the amparo to challenge inexact applications of
statutory law by judges.'" The amparo has become the primary instrument
for attacking unconstitutional official acts and laws at both the federal and
state. levels. Its modem scope is spelled out in the detailed provisions of the
Mexican Constitution,18 the Law of Amparo, and the Organic Law of the
Federal Judiciary.
The amparo operates formally to protect the individual and social rights
guaranteed by the first twenty-nine articles of the Mexican Constitution, the
"Bill of Rights." 19 But because of modem statutory and judicial interpreta-
tions of articles fourteen and sixteen of the constitution, the writ may extend
to violations of other constitutional limits on governmental activity as well.
Article fourteen permits district courts to enjoin officials who fail to follow
essential formalities of procedure and statutes issued prior to the con-
troversy.2" Article sixteen requires officials to demonstrate the competency
of their authority and the legal basis and justification for the action taken.2
These requirements are similar to the expansion of federal judicial power in
the United States under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the equal protection clause of the latter. 2
Mexican and Anglo-American scholars see few formal limits on the
reach of the amparo because of the incorporation effect of articles fourteen
and sixteen.23 For example, should the Mexican Congress enact a tax not
cional Mexicana, delivered at San Antonio, Texas (November 16, 1966) (available from
Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C.).
17. Judge Vallarta contended that the "Great Writ," habeas corpus, was the prim-
ary basis for expanding and centralizing judicial power in England and the United States.
1. VALLARTA, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO Y EL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1 (1881).
Rabasa rejected this argument as historically inaccurate in that the centralizing instrument
of the Marshall Court was the writ of error, not habeas corpus. E. RABASA, EL JUICIO
CONSTITUCIONAL 260-63 (1955) [hereinafter cited as RABASA].
18. MEX. CONST., supra note 6, arts. 103, 107.
19. See LAW OF AMPARO arts. 1, 4.
20. MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 14.
21. MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 16.
22. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 127 (1948);
McClosky, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial,
1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 34.
23. See R. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO
SUIT 19-31 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BAKER]; BURGOA, supra note 16, at 166-76; H.
SIERRA, EL AMPARO MEXICANO 126-28 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SIERRA]; Cabrera &
Headrick, Notes on Judicial Review in Mexico and the United States, 5 INTER-
AMERICAN L. REV. 253 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Cabrera & Headrick]; Zamudio, Al-
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authorized by article seventy-three of its constitution, the Supreme Court
could enjoin collection of that tax through its amparo powers. The Court has
infrequently but dramatically done precisely that; but more often it has cited
article seventy-three in voiding state intrusions into taxing powers constitu-
tionally reserved to the Mexican Congress.24
The amparo may. also be used to curb the acts of administrative tribu-
nals such as the Fiscal Court, the labor boards, police officers, prosecutors,
judges, legislatures, and even the President of the Republic. Under articles
fourteen and sixteen, they are the "responsible authorities" named by the
amparo plaintiff and can be held accountable for the incorrect applications
of laws as well as for violations of procedural due process.
Laws that by their mere promulgation cause immediate injury likewise
may be challenged as constitutionally defective before the Mexican Supreme
Court sitting en banc. This is accomplished through a separate proceeding
known as the amparo contra leyes, or constitutionality amparo."5 Parties
eligible to bring such actions include individual citizens, juveniles, aliens,
labor unions, business corporations, agrarian communities, and, when their
"patrimonial" or public employer interests are threatened, certain gov-
ernmental agencies. 6 In contrast to the usual procedure in the United States,
plaintiffs incur no filing fees or court costs in initiating amparo proceed-
ings.2"
The requirement that amparo judges must follow the principle of
"strict law" when deciding cases reflects Mexico's respect for the European
emphasis on the written code. "Strict law" means that a judge must affirm
or deny a petition solely on the basis of the statutory or constitutional points
raised by parties to the action.28 Appellate judges, however, may review the
entire trial record and, if the district judge has mistakenly denied relief on a
procedural ground, the points raised in the original pleadings are studied
without any formality of repleading. 29 The amparo exempts a number of
litigants and causes of action from the strict law requirement. In cases where
the plaintiff is in imminent danger of losing his life, physical well-being,
personal liberty, or pvivacy, the federal judge may grant the Mexican equiv-
gunos aspectos comparativos del derecho de amparo en Mexico y Venezuela, in 2 Li-
BRO HOMENAJE A LA MEMORIA DE LORENZO HERRERA MENDOZA 334, 344-56
(1970).
24. See BAKER, supra note 23, at 124-25 and cases cited therein.
25. See LAW OF AMPARO art. 114(1); BURGOA, supra note 16, at 604-05.
26. See LAW OF AMPARO arts. 4-19.
27. MEX CONST., supra note 6, art. 17.
28. LAW OF AMPARO art. 79; see BURGOA, supra note 16, at 298.
29. LAw OF AMPARO art. 91.
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alent of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction on the basis
of a description of the offending act, the official involved, and the location
of the threat.3" Though subject to verification in writing within three days,
such preliminary petitions may be communicated orally through a friend or
relative.31 The law of amparo also permits the judge to correct defects in
petitions submitted by those he perceives to be unable to hire adequate legal
counsel, including defendants in felony cases, individual workers in labor
disputes, communal farmers threatened with land seizures, juvenile defen-
dants, and those challenging laws already declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.32
In the United States, of course, there is no direct parallel to the strict
law principle in judicial decisionmaking. The Anglo-American judge con-
siders the legal arguments of plaintiffs, respondents, and amici curiae, but is
not restricted to the points raised therein in formulating his decision.33 But
petitioners in United States courts confront rules for appeals and extraordi-
nary writs that are more complex and confining than the open procedure
allowed in Mexico in emergency and other amparo cases. 34
Amparo judgments affect only the individual parties to the case without
"making any general declaration as to the law or act upon which the com-
plaint is based." 33 Thus the relativity of amparo decisions contrasts with the
rule of stare decisis in United States courts. This aspect of the law of amparo
demonstrates again how the influence of the European civil law tradition
30. Id. art. 117. See also MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 22.
31. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 117-18.
32. MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 107(11). For a discussion of the additional
exemption of communal farms in the revisions of the Law of Amparo in 1963, see I.
BURGOA, EL AMPARO EN MATERIA AGRARIA 123-25 (1964). In May 1976 the federal
Congress consolidated all the special procedural protections for communal farmers in arti-
cles 212-34 of the revised Law of Amparo.
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c); see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 98, at
487 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
34. See FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)-(d). See also Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ Writ-
ing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 371 (1968). One should also consider that "in a study of writs
prepared and filed by the inmates of the Florida Division of Corrections without the help
of counsel, it was found . . . that every writ in the sample of 170 contained one or more
misconceptions of the law." Jacob & Sharma, Justice after Trial: Prisoners' Need for
Legal Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493, 511 (1970).
The in forma pauperis petition available to indigent plaintiffs since the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), however, does
compare favorably with the amparo procedure. Even in cases before the Supreme Court
the only significant requirement is an affidavit establishing the petitioner's indigency.
Sup. CT. R. 53. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970).
35. MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 107(11).
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formally limits judicial decisionmmaking in Mexico. "Relativity" means
that each person challenging the same abusive official act-or the same
plaintiff aggrieved by subsequent acts of the same official-must litigate his
claim separately before the amparo court.3" The only exception arises when
the Supreme Court, either en bane or through one of its four specialized
chambers, or a circuit appeals court establishes jurisprudencia by handing
down five consecutive identical decisions on the same point of law. Such
jurisprudencia then binds all inferior courts (state and federal), labor media-
tion boards, and administrative tribunals in a manner similar to the rule of
stare decisis.37 Nonjudicial actors in the legal system are not so bound,
however, and prospective litigants must still challenge them in original
amparo proceedings. Similarly, aggrieved citizens not wishing to pursue
such a course of action can only hope that hundreds and even thousands of
successful amparo petitions will force the bureaucrats to change their ways
or the legislature to change the laws. This "political barometer" function of
the amparo does work effectively in certain policy areas. 38
Having explored some of the general characteristics of the amparo
system, it is now necessary to outline the three major forms of the amparo:
(1) the "direct amparo"-used to attack the judgments of other courts,
usually after the exhaustion of at least one ordinary appeal; (2) the "indirect
amparo," which lies against the administrative acts of authorities not
finalized in judicial decisions; and (3) the "constitutionality amparo,"
which, as mentioned previously, is the sole method available to invalidate
statutes, regulations, or presidential decrees deemed to inflict self-executing
harm. Special attention shall be given to the indirect amparo because that
proceeding is the exclusive concern of the federal district courts, and, more
importantly, comprises the vast majority of all amparo actions brought in
Mexico. The following organizational chart depicts the relationship of the
amparo process to the jurisdictions of the United States federal judiciary.
36. See BURGOA, supra note 16, at 280-82.
37. LAw OF AMPARO arts. 192-93.
38. See Schwarz, Judges under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the United
States and Mexico, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 260, 302-13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Schwarz]. The impact of amparo litigation on official discretion has been most effective
in these policy areas: state and federal taxation of income and real property; military con-
trol over pensions, housing, and non-service-connected crimes by soldiers; denials to
aliens of professional licenses and due process in certain deportation actions; expropriation
of real property for public uses; and government taking of lands under the agrarian reform
laws. The latter, in fact, have produced the greatest controversy over the amparo deci-
sions of the federal district judges and administrative chamber of the Supreme Court. Id.
at 296-302.
Winter 1977]
TABLE I: ORGANIZATION OF MEXICAN FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE AMPARO PROCESS














involving sentences of death
and at least 5 years
imprisonment; all federal
and military convictions;






All cases from federal
courts in amounts more than
U.S. $8,000, or as
"undeterminable"; all
family relations appeals
from state and federal
courts; judicial errors
outside of final judgments
decided in amparo by
district courts (indirect
amparos).
)LLEGIATE CIRCUIT COURTS (3-Judge)
51 Magistrates-10 Circuits
almost entirely amparo cases, both direct and







- - - - - - - - - --- )-
Administrative Chamber
5 Ministers
All direct amparos wherein
amount exceeds U.S.
$40,000 if involving a
federal administrative
tribunal (e.g., Fiscal Court
as a party); absent
determinable amount, any
"issue of transcending
importance for the national
interest"; Federal Treasury
appeals from Fiscal Court
rulings; all agrarian rights






involving awards of federal
or state mediation boards
relating to "collectives"




errors outside final awards.
UNITARY CIRCUIT COURTS (Single Judge)
9 Magistrates--8 Circuits
Hears exclusively appeals from ordinary civil and
criminal judgments in federal district and territories.
- * FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
63 Judges-42 Districts
Hears ordinary civil and criminal cases in federal
district and territories and all amparo suits (penal,
civil, administrative, and labor) except those brought
under direct amparo.
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C. The Direct Amparo and Appellate Remedies in the United States
The direct amparo initially is brought before the penal, administrative,
civil, or labor chambers of the Mexican Supreme Court (depending on the
subject matter of the petition), or the collegiate circuit courts.39 It has be-
come the ultimate remedy for challenging any final judgment of a state or
federal appeals court, labor mediation board, or administrative tribunal-
most often the highly respected and influential Federal Fiscal Tribunal, or
tax court. The ability of the Supreme Court and the collegiate courts to
reinforce their judgments through the doctrine of jurisprudencia facilitates
unity of jurisprudence and judicial centralization.4" The direct amparo
dominates the caseloads of both the Supreme Court and, to a lesser extent,
the collegiate courts.41 The largest single category of such filings in the
Supreme Court relates to complaints of those convicted of state and federal
crimes.42
The direct amparo procedure requires the exhaustion of at least one
ordinary appeal, either judicial or administrative, before the challenged
judgment can be considered sufficiently final.43 The direct amparo is availa-
ble to litigants as a matter of right." Grounds for reversal on direct amparo
are that the challenged court denied the plaintiff due process during the trial
or on appeal45 or misapplied the substantive law to the facts of the case
contrary to article fourteen of the Mexican Constitution.4" Thus, the direct
amparo performs the function of "cassation" in the system. Courts of
cassation in the civil law systems of France, Austria, Switzerland, and
Germany have the function of "ensuring the uniform interpretation of the
law; consequently, although in theory their decisions are not binding on
themselves or on lower courts, theirs is the final voice on the meaning to be
given to provisions of law throughout the ordinary courts." 4" The Mexi-
39. See Table I supra.
40. ZAMUDIO, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO, supra note 15, at 130-31.
41. More than 74% of the Supreme Court's '6,800 new filings and about half of
the circuit courts' input of 17,400 petitions during 1973 comprised direct amparos. IN-
FORME DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE LA NACION 1973, annexes 9,
11 [hereinafter cited as INFORME... .
42. Id. annex 11.
43. See MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 107(111)(a); BURGOA, supra note 16, at
284.
44. See BURGOA, supra note 16, at 284.
45. In Mexican parlance, errors "in the proceeding." See MEX. CONST., supra
note 6, art. 107(II0); LAW OF AMPARO art. 158.
46. MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 107(I); LAW OF AMPARO arts. 158-60;
BURGOA, supra note 16, at 651-52.
47. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 128-29 (1969).
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can direct amparo court not only reviews alleged due process violations, but
concurrently "may transform all mistaken interpretations of state and fed-
eral laws into violations of the Constitution.' '4
The jurisdiction and procedure of United States federal courts resemble
the direct amparo in that the Supreme Court's review of direct appeals on
federal question grounds from state courts of last resort is one of its largest
categories of cases.49 The two judicial systems' methods for reviewing
lower court decisions differ strikingly, however.
First, federal courts in the United States, including the Supreme Court,
rarely review decisions of state courts that have at least in part relied on their
own state constitutions in arriving at a given decision."0 In diversity of
citizenship cases, the Rules of Decision Act5' and the Supreme Court's
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins52 require the federal courts to
apply state substantive law. Furthermore, the general anti-injunction stat-
ute5" and general principles of federalism ordinarily prohibit federal court
intervention in state judicial and administrative proceedings until state rem-
edies are exhausted. 4 Such respect for the principle of judicial restraint,
however, does not apply to civil rights specifically guaranteed by constitu-
tional provisions or federal statutes. In those cases, petitioners are not re-
quired to exhaust state remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of federal
courts.55
48. Cabrera & Headrick, supra note 23, at 259.
49. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970) with ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY arts. 24-27 (statutory jurisdiction of the four chambers of the Mexican Court
on direct amparo matters). With regard to caseloads, see The Supreme Court, 1962 Term,
77 HARV. L. REV. .62, 90-91 (1963) (the last year when the Harvard Law Review spec-
ified such data in detail), and recent volumes of the monthly Seminario Judicial de la
Federacion.
50. See Williams v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 375, 399 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
52. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See generally Kanowitz, Deciding Federal Law Is-
sues in Civil Proceedings: State Versus Federal Trial Courts, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
141 (1976).
54. Although the abstention doctrine strongly reinforces the exhaustion rule, it
nonetheless allows a right of return to the federal court once state remedies have been
pursued." See Annot., 20 L. Ed. 2d 1623, 1659 (1969). The federal doctrine of deferral,
on the other hand, requires dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and "return to federal court
could occur in narrowly restricted circumstances only." Note, Limiting the Section 1983
Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486, 1499 (1969).
55. Zwickler v. Koota, 390 U.S. 611 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965) (both enjoining state criminal proceedings). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452 (1974) (issuing a declaratory judgment against a "facially invalid" state crimi-
nal trespass law); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
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In Mexico, by contrast, the direct amparo grants the federal appellate
courts the power of cassation over all matters of substantive law. The impor-
tant distinction between the two systems is that the federal appellate courts
in the United States cannot issue comprehensive "writs of error" in curing
substantive law defects of state judgments. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
exercises broad discretion with respect to issuing writs of certiorari. 6 Not
even death sentences involving federal questions require review by the
United States Supreme Court as a matter of right; conversely, such extreme
sentences must be reviewed by the penal chamber of the Mexican Court.5"
A second major difference between the United States procedure and the
direct amparo is the power of Anglo-American trial and appellate courts to
cure violations of constitutional rights along with strictly legal errors. Dur-
ing pretrial stages, the judge rules on various motions that may involve such
issues as unconstitutional search and seizure and the effect of excessive
pretrial publicity on a defendant's right to a fair trial. Appellate judges
frequently are asked to decide whether proper constitutional procedure has
been followed at trial. Moreover, in contrast to Mexican practice, there are
multiple state remedies available to litigants under state law including, in
most states, review by at least two tiers of appellate courts. Mexicans
disappointed with trial judgments ordinarily have only one appeal to the
state supreme courts or, in federal cases, to the unitary circuit courts.58
Finally, it must be remembered that Anglo-American litigants in state courts
may raise both federal and state constitutional questions in conjunction with
issues of state substantive law. Such concurrent jurisdiction.is prohibited
only when the United States is a.party to the suit or when Congress grants
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal judiciary.59 In Mexico, the federal
judiciary has exclusive control over the amparo.
Third, the United States Supreme Court frequently hears cases on cer-
tiorari from the federal courts of appeals, whereas the Mexican Supreme
Court rarely reviews judgments of the collegiate circuit courts." ° This
56. SuP. CT. R. 19.
57. The penal chamber must review by direct amparo all capital sentences and all
sentences resulting in five or more years of incarceration. ORGANIC LAW OF THE FED-
ERAL JUDICIARY art. 24(111).
58. See Table I supra.
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) (admiralty jurisdiction); id. § 1334 (bankruptcy);
id. § 1338 (patents); id. § 1345 (government as plaintiff); id. § 1346 (government as de-
fendant) (1970).
60. During the 1962-1963 term, the last year for which data is available in the
Harvard Law Review on the sources of cases disposed of by the Supreme Court, more
than 40% of the high Court's appellate caseload came from challenges to courts of ap-
peals decisions. The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1, 90-91 (1963). In
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bottleneck function of the collegiate courts in Mexico is attributable to the
legislative intent behind the 1968 amparo reforms, which apparently was to
bifurcate the jurisdiction of the two highest court levels and thus reduce the
flood of less important amparo cases reaching the Supreme Court.
Fourth, appellate review of the actions of administrative tribunals in
the United States is more cumbersome than under the direct amparo pro-
ceeding. In the United States there are agencies and specialized courts with
powers comparable to the Mexican Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration
and the Federal Fiscal Tribunal. These include the National Labor Relations
Board, the federal Tax Court, and the so-called independent regulatory
agencies established with special quasi-judicial and rule-making authority,
such as the Federal Trade Commission. In contrast to Mexican amparo
procedure, regulations promulgated by administrative tribunals are attacked
first in federal district courts, 6 or the courts of appeals,6" depending on the
agency named as defendant in the case. If defeated in these lower courts,
the United States litigant then must seek discretionary review by the Su-
preme Court. Appealing decisions of administrative tribunals to the federal
courts involves a route.more closely resembling the procedure of the Mexi-
can indirect amparo.
D. Constitutionality Amparos and Judicial Review in the United States
The constitutionality amparo is the only Mexican judicial vehicle for
directly questioning the inherent constitutionality of statutes, executive regu-
lations, or presidential decrees. It most closely approximates the United
States remedies of declaratory judgment and injunctive relief because it
permits the plaintiff to clarify his constitutional rights before a statute may
be enforced against him.63 In Mexico, those statutes or regulations vulnera-
Mexico a decision of the circuit court cannot be reviewed unless a "constitutionality"
question is involved that has no applicable jurisprudencia defined by the Supreme Court
en banc. Even here the constitutionality issue must have been raised through a direct am-
paro complaint, which is extremely rare. See Ramirez, La reforma de 1968 en materia
adininistrativa, al pode judicial de la federaci6n, 10 EL FoRo 55, 67 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Ramirez]. See also LAW OF AMPARO arts. 83(V), 84(11).
61. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970).
62. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (Supp. V 1975).
63. See 28 U.S.C. §§2201-02 (1970). The Supreme Court has given varying in-
terpretations of the Declaratory Judgment Act. In one case, it stated: "[T]he Declaratory
Judgment Act. . . 'is an enabling act, which confers a discretion on the court rather than
an absolute right for the litigant' . . . . [Thus] if we are to avoid rendering a series of
advisory opinions, adjudication of the reach and constitutionality [of the statute] must
await a concrete fact situation." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1965). On the other
hand, nine years later the Court declared: "That Congress plainly intended declaratory
relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction and to be utilized to
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ble to the constitutionality amparo are called self-executing, because by
their promulgation they require immediate and possibly harmful compliance
with their rules.64 This self-executing concept finds more subtle expression
in United States cases where the devices of habeas corpus, injunction,
declaratory judgment, and removal to federal courts are used to thwart
enforcement of statutes that by their very terms threaten the free exercise of
a specific constitutional or statutory civil right.65 Both removal and injunc-
tion, however, are tied to the manner of enforcement or prosecution under
the statute.66
Like the indirect amparo against illegal actions, cases involving the
constitutionality amparo are filed first in district court. Unlike other am-
paros, however, the plenary Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdic-
tion over constitutionality amparos.67 This means that if, for example, the
test the constitutionality of state criminal statutes in cases where injunctive relief would be
unavailable is amply evidenced by the legislative history of the [Declaratory Judgment
Act] . . . . 'A state statute may be declared unconstitutional in toto-that is, incapable
of having constitutioial applications . . . .If a declaration of total unconstitutionality is
affirmed by this Court, it follows that this Court stands ready to reverse any conviction
under the statute.' " Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466, 469-70 (1974) (quoting
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124-25 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)).
64. LAW OF AMPARO art. 114(1); BURGOA, supra note 16, at 604-05. The con-
stitutionality thus vindicates the theory of the eminent scholar on the writ, Emilio'Rabasa,
who stated that if a law "personified" itself in an immediate and thus concrete injury, it
became subject to amparo review. His classic example was the unconstitutionally derived
death sentence: "Until the sentence is carried out, no act is required other than that of the
execution itself, nor would any violation be committed but by the platoon shooting the
defendant." RABASA, supra note 7, at 288.
65. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442-43 (1970) (federal removal petition); id. §§ 2201-02
(declaratory judgment); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (the general injunction statute for civil
rights cases); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-54 (1970) (federal habeas corpus). All of these devices
have had an active recent history in the area of civil rights litigation. For such use of the
federal injunction statute, see cases cited in note 55 supra; Comment, Federal Removal
and Injunction to Protect Political Expression and Racial Equalit': A Proposed Change,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 694 (1969).
66. Regarding the federal injunction, the Supreme Court in recent years has re-
quired that there be bad faith prosecution under statutes unclear in their meaning and thus
"chilling" of particular federal rights. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Came-
ron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). The Court has required deference to state tribunals
when, barring a clear showing of harassment and bad faith, state prosecutions or proceed-
ings are pending. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).
Removal of state criminal prosecutions under section 1443 of title 28 is available
only in "the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of
a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by
the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court." City of Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828 (1966). See WRIGHT, supra note 33, § 38, at 151.
67. ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. I 1(IV bis, a).
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amparo petition presents a grievance against the allegedly illegal enforce-
ment of a business licensing law as well as one against the discriminatory
provisions of the law itself, the trial judge transfers the whole matter to the
plenary Court. All twenty-one ministers of the Court must then decide on the
validity of the law itself, before remanding the case to the trial court for an
interpretation of the statute or its execution. 8
The constitutionality amparo has two procedural advantages over the
means of judicially testing the constitutionality of a statute used in the
United States. First, the plaintiff need not exhaust his ordinary administra-
tive or judicial remedies beforehand; in fact, if he does, he is considered to
have tacitly consented to the offending law.69 At that point, he can challenge
only the means used to administer the law rather than the law itself."0
Second, the constitutionality amparo proceeding is theoretically rapid. It
allows the Supreme Court to decide the fundamental question of constitu-
tionality en banc, or to remand the case to the appropriate chamber or circuit
court. It further permits the district court to waive the strict law and fifteen
day filing limits required for other amparo petitions.71
On the other hand, the amparo procedure in practice obstructs both
speedy and flexible constitutional interpretation because it forces the Su-
preme Court to validate or invalidate the entire statute before considering
whether there has been faulty application of the law. Further, fourteen of the
twenty-one ministers of the Court must hand down five identical consecutive
decisions to establish jurisprudencia regarding the challenged law." This
exacerbates the inherent disorganization of the Mexican Supreme Court that
is caused by its division into four chambers dealing with highly disparate
subject matter whose members demonstrate little formal interaction.73
The result of this jurisdiction and procedure is that the constitutionality
amparo is an awkward and rarely successful remedy. One minister could
remember only six jurisprudencial declarations invalidating laws, regula-
tions, or decrees out of more than a thousand amparo petitions processed
during the period from 1958 to 1966.14 The Mexican Congress enacted the
68. LAW OF AMPARO art. 92.
69. LAW oF AMPARO art. 73(XII).
70. The 1968 reforms liberalized this requirement by providing that a petitioner can
still attack a statute even after asserting his rights through an administrative or judicial
appeal as long as he brings the first action within fifteen days of the enforcement notice
and the constitutionality amparo within thirty days after the failure of that recourse. LAW
oF AMPARO arts. 22(I), 73(XII).
71. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra, for discussion of the strict law prin-
ciple.
72. LAW OF AMPARO art. 192.
73. Schwarz, supra note 38, at 314.
74. Ramirez, supra note 60, at 68; see INFORME . . . 1958-1966, supra note 41,
annexes 11.
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constitutionality amparo in order to limit the growing independence of the
administrative chamber, particularly in tax, licensing, and agrarian law
cases. 5 In responding to the great backlog in the plenary Court's docket
created by this reform, however, the Congress in 1968 expressly permitted
each of the four chambers to apply existing jurisprudencia of the plenary
Court to all types of amparos coming before them." The average delay
before the plenary Court is the longest of any chamber of the Court. A
survey of fifty-seven decisions in 1968 revealed that the average plaintiff
waited more than six years from the date of filing in the plenary Court until
final judgment."7 Twelve cases had languished eleven or more years before a
decision was eventually handed down."7
In the United States courts, by contrast, issues of the highest constitu-
tional significance can be raised and resolved in connection with relatively
minor cases.79 Moreover, such a mixture of legal and constitutional claims
may be decided by state as well as federal courts. State and federal courts in
the United States also demonstrate great creativity in narrowing constitu-
tionally offensive statutes to avoid nullifying them completely.8" Finally,
United States Supreme Court invalidation of a law carries with it an ergo
omnes effect, at least as that law becomes unenforceable through the opera-
tion of stare decisis.
The advantage of the Mexican Court's clarification of precedent
through the procedure ofjurisprudencia is more than offset by the disadvan-
tages of the relative rarity with which it is invoked, and the necessity for
each litigant separately to attack laws already declared unconstitutional. The
political results of the two countries' methods of review are strikingly differ-
ent. Compared to only six Mexican instances of abrogation throughjuris-
prudencia during the period 1958 to 1966, the United States Supreme Court
struck down twelve acts of Congress during the brief period of 1969 to
1974.81
75. See Schwarz, supra note 38, at 260.
76. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 192-93.
77. See INFORME . . . 1968, supra note 41, annex 10 (plenary).
78. Id.
79. E.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (criminal due
process complaint involving a fine of ten dollars); see ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 176-
77.
80. This point is amply illustrated in the frequent adherence to the famous
"Ashwander Rules." Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). For an example of tortuous reasoning to save the statute as well as the plain-
tiff, see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (regarding a provision of the Selec-
tive Service Act defining "conscientious objectors").
81. ABRAHAM, supra note 8. at 279-93.
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E. The Indirect Amparo, Parallel Remedies in the United States and the
Primary Role of the Federal District Courts
The indirect amparo petition is brought before a federal district judge,
usually the one closest to where the alleged violation occurred. There were
more than 63,600 district court rulings on indirect amparo petitions in 1974,
comprising seventy-eight percent of all amparo decisions by the federal
judiciary during that year. 2 The volume of indirect amparo decisions and
that of direct amparo rulings have increased at similar rates-more than
twenty percent since 1968-compared to a twenty-four percent increase in
the number of cases terminated in the Mexican Supreme Court and col-
legiate circuit courts.8 3 Filings increased proportionately, indicating that the
district judges continue to serve as the first line of defense for controlling
official abuse in the cities and countryside. 4
Federal district courts in both the United States and Mexico are the
general courts of original jurisdiction 5 and theirs is the final word for the
vast majority of litigants. Relatively few cases are appealed to the next
highest tier in the federal judiciary in either country. This holds true for both
constitutional rights cases and civil and criminal cases brought under federal
statutes.86 Even fewer district court judgments are reversed on appeal. In
1973, for example, the United States courts of appeals reversed trial deci-
sions in only twelve and one-half percent of the criminal cases before them
and twenty-one percent of the civil cases.8" A typical Mexican circuit court,
observed in 1972, exhibited a more critical attitude toward amparo judg-
ments of the district judges, but still reversed in less than twenty-five percent
of the cases.88
The indirect amparo is, in fact, a narrowly confined and frequently
82. INFORME . . . 1974, supra note 41, annexes 1, 2, 10-11. These figures ex-
clude "competency" disputes and complaints about the enforcement of amparo judgments
and executive decrees as well as other non-amparo dispositions.
83. Id.
84. See text accompanying notes 117-30 infra, for an analysis of accessibility as
compared to United States district courts.
85. See WRIGHT, supra note 33, § 2, at 7.
86. While 143,832 criminal and civil cases of all kinds were terminated in the
United States district courts between 1971 and 1972, in only 12,379 was an appeal filed
in the courts of appeals. M. HINDELANG, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 296, 314 (1973). During 1974, the Mexican district courts decided 62,600
aniparos, while only 8,000 appeals from such judgments were filed in the circuit courts
(7,000) and Supreme Court (1,000). See INFORME . . . 1974, supra note 41, annexes 9,
11.
87. ANNUAL REPORT,- ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, UNITED STATES COURTS
301 (1973).
88. See Schwarz, supra note 38, at 326-27.
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unsuccessful method for correcting all forms of judicial error in comparison
to the system of extraordinary writs and statutory remedies available in
United States district courts. It can lie against acts of judges and members of
labor boards and administrative tribunals only when the judicial officer has
(1) committed an abuse outside of the trial or hearing, such as issuance of an
unfounded arrest warrant or confinement order; (2) irreparably damaged the
amparo plaintiff's opportunity to defend his interests, such as by denial of
an opportunity to appeal in either criminal or civil cases "for lack of an
expressed injury"; or (3) decided a civil, labor, or administrative case
against a third party who was absent during the proceeding.89
In the United States a litigant aggrieved by the arbitrary actions of a
judge before the trial or appeal is completed has a number of alternative
means of relief, both in state and federal courts. He may petition for a writ of
mandamus (e.g., to initiate a speedy trial when a prior demand to do so has
not been met9"); a writ of prohibition (e.g., to prevent a trial that threatens
the defendant with double jeopardy91); habeas corpus (e.g., to challenge an
allegedly involuntary plea of guilty9"); or a writ of error coram nobis (to
correct erroneous sentences in the sentencing court 3). Or he may seek
removal from a state trial court to a federal district court (e.g., when peti-
tioner is "denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such a state a right under
any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United
States").94
It is in regard to abuses by public administrators and police that the
89. LAW OF AMPARO art. I14(III-V).
90. Fowler v. Hunter, 114 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 868
(1948).
91. Paulson v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 1, 372 P.2d 641, 22 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1962).
92. Sessions v. Wilson, 372 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1966). See generally 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970). It should be noted that the scope and extent of habeas corpus
proceedings have been undercut by certain recent decisions. For example, decisions by the
Warren Court had significantly expanded the discretion of federal district court judges to
entertain collateral attacks on prior state and federal judgments. See, e.g., Kauffman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). A recent
opinion by the United States Supreme Court, however, held that "where the state has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the
Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was intro-
duced at his trial." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). Thus at least in petitions
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2234 (1970), alleging state violations of the exclusionary rules
of evidence, the Court may have placed significant limits on the powver of intervention by
federal district court judges similar to those extant in the indirect amparo system.
93. Sanders v. United States, 373. U.S. 1 (1963). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1970). See Georgia v. Raehell, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
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indirect amparo offers the most viable remedy to an aggrieved party. Here
the amparo possesses a number of attractive jurisdictional and procedural
features. A litigant threatened with imminent danger has available to him a
simple, speedy, and effective procedure. Imminent dangers are probable
injuries to a detained person's personal liberty, privacy, and physical well-
being. The most serious of these dangers, according to the law of amparo
and Supreme Courtjurisprudencia, involve official acts threatening unlaw-
ful deportation, capital punishment, and other abuses prohibited by article
twenty-two of the Constitution (e.g., flogging, beating, torture). Less acute
emergencies may arise when the judge, jailer, policeman, or mayor violates
any of the individual rights guaranteed under articles sixteen (unwarranted
searches and seizures), nineteen (formal orders of confinement, based on
specific facts and charges, and freedom from mistreatment under detention),
and twenty. Article twenty covers a host of pretrial and trial guarantees,
including guarantees of arraignment, speedy trial, and adequate counsel.
One of the most frequent complaints against the criminal justice system in
Mexico concerns local detentions for more than three days without formal
arraignment or confinement orders. 95
The amparo judge's first act on hearing such complaints may be to
order the offending practice temporarily suspended, 96 and to call for the
responsible authority to answer to the complaint within twenty-four hours of
notification. He then will order a constitutional hearing at which plaintiffs,
responsible authorities, and third parties can submit further responses,
amendments, or depositions.9" During this full hearing, oral testimony is
limited to one half hour for each party and witness.98 These emergency cases
and those involving communal agrarian land claims are the only amparo
proceedings wherein oral testimony or arguments at the bar are expressly
granted. Thus far the Mexican indirect amparo proceedings resemble those
required prior to the issuance of a temporary restraining order in the United
States. These proceedings produce no decision on the merits. The chal-
lenged conduct is at most suspended until facts are produced to support the
same judge's modification, revocation, or permanent extension of the origi-
95. This is popularly known as the sabatazo, or "weekend bust," enabling the jail-
ers to hold persons incommunicado and extract payments until the judges' offices open the
following week.
96. The suspensi6n de oficio is particularly responsive to the imminent dangers
cited above because it enjoins the official action on the barest of preliminary information
from the plaintiff. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 123-24. See SIERRA, supra note 23, at 494-
504.
97. LAW oF AMPARO art. 131.
98. Id. art. 78.
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nal order.99 If the judge then applies the amparo's protection through a
"final suspension," the responsible agency must cease the abusive action
within twenty-four hours of notice.100 At the initiative of the trial judge, the
Supreme Court may remove from office and punish any official failing to
comply with final amparo decisions."0 '
The final suspension by the amparo judge, subject to appeal, combines
the effects of several extraordinary writs and other remedies in United States
courts. These include (1) the permanent, mandatory, or preliminary injunc-
tion; 0 2 (2) the writ of mandamus, used "to compel performance of [un]per-
formed 'legal duty' ,,;103 (3) the writ of habeas corpus, used "to give a
person whose liberty is restrained an immediate hearing to . . .determine
the legality of the detention";"' (4) the writ of prohibition, which prevents a
threatened exercise of judicial power in excess of the jurisdiction of a tri-
bunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial functions;.0 5 (5) the
declaratory judgment, providing "a speedy remedy, in cases of actual con-
troversy, for determining issues and adjudicating legal rights, duties, or
status of the respective parties, before . . . the invasion of rights and
commission of wrongs";.0 6 and (6) the ancient writ of quo warranto, by
which the holder of a franchise or office can be ousted if his claim to that
office is without legal foundation."'
Essentially the same scope, procedures, and effects of the indirect
amparo would obtain where a ministerial or other administrative act in a
99. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (b), (d) (temporary restraining order); BURGOA, supra
note 16, at 511.
100. LAW OF AMPARO art. 105.
101. Id. art 108; Compilaci6n de la jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte, 1917-
1965, in 105 MARTERIA GENERAL THESES 207 (1966).
102. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65; 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 1-5 (1945). The prelimi-
nary injunction, like the indirect amparo's final suspension, is subject to immediate ap-
peal, but it is reviewed in a final hearing by the issuing court, in contrast to the amparo
suspension, which is appealable as a matter of right to either the Supreme or circuit
courts. LAW OF AMPARO art. 86.
103. 14 C.J.S. Certiorari § 4(d) (1939); see Maine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d
375, 438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968).
104. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 2 (1976); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
105. See Aronoff v. Franci-hise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 177, 383 P.2d 409, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1963); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1102 (West 1973).
106. 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 8 (1956). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02
(1970) and CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1973) for parallels between the
"constitutionality amparo" and declaratory judgment.
107. 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 1 (1951); see Bohannan v. Arizona ex. rel. Smith,
389 U.S. I (1968). Such a removal sanction might be compared to the process under
article 108 of the Law of Amparo and the Mexican federal penal code directed against an
official found in consistent noncompliance with amparo judgments.
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noncriminal matter is brought under attack. It is in this context that the
amparo offers the most apparent advantage over judicial remedies and pro-
cesses in the United States.
The Mexican federal judiciary, beginning with the district judges, pos-
sesses sweeping power to review administrative acts that are either in excess
of the agency's statutory jurisdiction or are simply arbitrary. It may do so
through the uniform, familiar, and relatively simple procedure of the indi-
rect amparo. Article fourteen's mandate of legality in official decision mak-
ing, so important to the broad reach of the direct amparo, is also supportive
here:
No law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, possessions, or rights with-
out a trial by a duly created court'in which the essential formalities of
procedure are observed and in accordance with laws issued prior to the
act.1
08
The Law of Amparo specifically permits indirect amparo actions against
proceedings following the form of a trial; thus the legality principle of article
fourteen may apply to administrative agencies that are statutorily empow-
ered to carry out an adjudicative function exercised through an established
hearing procedure.'0 9 Through this device, the administrator can be held
accountable for violating the rules and procedures of his own governing
statute."'
Article sixteen of the Mexican Constitution provides an even broader
basis of judicial scrutiny because, by its terms, the agency is required not
only to defend its statutory jurisdiction but also to state its reasons for
applying a particular statute or regulation in search and seizure cases. Ad-
ministrative acts violating judicial standards of fairness and due process may
be enjoined even where the governing statute requires no specific hearing
procedure."' This is another major reason why plaintiffs need not exhaust
108. MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 14.
109. In California such "adjudicatory" actions, e.g., denial of a professional
license by the Board of Medical Examiners, are singulary enjoinable through an all-
purpose writ called the administrative mandamus. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5
(West Cum. Supp. 1977). See generally CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS
(California Continuing Education of the Bar, No. 31, 1967); E. FRANK, CALIFORNIA
CIVIL WRITS 24-27 (California Continuing Education of the Bar, No. 47, 1970).
110. See, e.g., The Dietine Co., 106 Semanario 6a epoca, 3a parte, 54 (Adminis-
trative) (April 13, 1966), in which the Mexican Supreme Court's administrative chamber
upheld a final suspension against the "excessive" discretion exercised by an official who
voided a trademark without a hearing and without the authorization of the Secretary of
Industrial Property.
111. MEX. CONST., supra note 6, art. 107(IV); Antonio Garcia Michel, 108
Semanario 6a 6poca, 3a parte, 99 (Administrative) (June 13, 1966).
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certain administrative remedies before bringing their complaints to a federal
district judge."'
In summary, perhaps the major advantage of the indirect amparo over
existing judicial remedies for administrative abuses in the United States is
that it affords an easier method for challenging unfairness committed in a
perfectly lawful manner. The judge in an indirect amparo proceeding does
not, in theory, defer to rules of substantial evidence, administrative discre-
tion, informal official deliberation, or conclusive presumptions of the
agency when the petitioner has been neither informed about the charges
against him nor allowed free access to the decisional process before a final
and potentially injurious determination is made.11 3 Through the indirect
amparo, the aggrieved party may halt or void proceedings effectively leav-
ing him without a defense, and compel the production or airing of evidence
material to his case.
II. The Mexican Amparo and Constitutional
Rights Remedies in the United States
Evaluated: Accessibility of the
Federal District Courts
The best features of the amparo system, as compared to federal con-
stitutional rights remedies in the United States, are its procedural economy
and accessibility. This is particularly true of the indirect amparo in Mexican
federal district courts.
Accessibility to the courts is encouraged by certain procedural aspects
of the indirect amparo already discussed: the imminent danger concept of
legal injury, the numerous but clearly stated exceptions to the exhaustion of
remedies rule in administrative law cases, and the simplicity of the amparo
hearing. There are other reasons why the indirect amparo is widely per-
ceived as creating judicial ombudsmen in the cities and countryside." 4
These include the absence of formal filing fees and court costs, the standing
112. For the Mexican version of the exhaustion requirement, and exceptions
thereto, as compared to both federal and California applications, see Schwarz, Exceptions
to the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under the Mexican Writ of Amparo: Some
Possible Applications to Judicial Review in the United States, 7 CAL. W. L. REV. 331
(1971).
113. For a general discussion of the rules governing federal judicial review of deci-
sions by administrative agencies in the United States, see M. SHAPIRO, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 116-31 (1968).
114. For a brief comparison of the amparo generally with the ombudsman-citizen
grievance agency concept, see Schwarz, Mexican Writ of Amparo: Extraordinary Remedy
against Official Abuse of Individual Rights: I, 10 Pun. AFF. REP. 1-2 (1969).
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accorded to aliens and juveniles, the ability of the federal judge unilaterally
to correct deficiencies of a complaint, the opportunity for the parties to avoid
technical prerequisites such as the fifteen-day filing deadline and the need to
renew petitions within three hundred days after filing, and the availability of
federal public defenders in amparo cases arising from criminal prosecutions.
But what makes the amparo process truly accessible is its familiarity to
the people throughout Mexico. As one attorney practicing in Guanajuato
stated:
Why do I think the majority of our people are careful to be informed
about their constitutional guarantees and the amparo? It is this: A man in
a state of nature looks for a cave; a sick man seeks a doctor and medicine,
and in the political world man looks for someone to protect him. That
"someone" in Mexico is the federal judge and the remedy of amparo. "'
In a recent comparative study of litigation rates in three countries,
Professors Grossman and Sarat reminded us that American courts "may, in
a sense, invite litigation by the way they handle certain kinds of issues, but
they must await the development of real 'cases and controversies'; and,
more importantly, they must await private choices which may or may not
bring these cases and controversies to court.'"'11 These authors go on to
speculate that "sheer accessibility of courts in a physical and psychological
sense is an important determinant of litigation."" ' They attempt to explain
why the litigation rate in the federal courts of the United States (number of
cases filed in the federal district courts per 100,000 population) has in-
creased at a steady rate, but has fluctuated widely from region to region in a
way that could not be positively correlated with the socio-economic de-
velopment of the various states. For our purposes, their most important
finding was the spectacular increase in the federal litigation rates of civil
cases from 29.1 cases to 43.9 per 100,000 between 1962 and 1972.18 By
contrast, studies of Spain and England showed that in both countries the
litigation rate increased in the early stages of their development, but that
with industrial maturity the litigation rate levels decreased even though the
number of legal transactions may have continued to increase dramatically.' 19
Mexico's litigation rate in amparo filings before the federal district
courts resembles the recent United States experience far more than it does
that of Spain or England. But that rate differs from the United States litiga-
tion rates in its modest yet consistent rate of increase. Compared to the total
115. Interview with Lie. Pastor Yafiez P6rez (July 23, 1968).
116. Grossman & Sarat, Litigation in the Federal Courts: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, 9 L. & Soc. REv. 321 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Grossman & Sarat].
117. Id. at 344.
118. Id. at 336.
119. Id. at 323-24.
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litigation rate of 43.9 per 100,000 population in the United States federal
district courts during 1972, Mexican district judges received more than 115
amparo filings (by definition, constitutional rights cases alone) per 100,000
people in 1974. This represents only a four percent increase over the litiga-
tion rate of 110 per 100,000 in 1968.120 The district courts in 1974 registered
an almost twenty percent increase in the absolute number of amparo cases
over 1968121 compared to an increase of more than seventy percent for all
civil cases filed in the United States during the period 1962 to 1972.2'
The steady increase in amparo litigation commenced in the federal
courts could be attributed to the fact that Mexico is a developing nation, as
well as to the peculiarly attractive features of the amparo proceeding itself.
It would be mere conjecture to suggest that Mexicans are more litigious or
oriented toward constitutional rights than citizens in the United States. The
difference between federal civil litigation rates in Mexico and the United
States perhaps can be explained by the numerous other recourses open to the
potential litigant in the United States as compared to Mexico; for example,
the heavier use of state courts and ombudsman-like functions performed by
legislators and administrators in the United States. Although no reliable
litigation data are presently available for all fifty states, California dem-
onstrates the judicial alternatives sought vis-i-vis the federal courts. Total
filings in the state's superior courts numbered 562,100 in the 1973-1974
fiscal year, representing a litigation rate of 2,676 cases per 100,000 popula-
tion.'23 Data on filings and dispositions in the Mexican state courts are
sparse. But it is safe to assume that because of the federal judicial monopoly
over all significant constitutional rights adjudication via the amparo and
related recourses and the lesser reputation of state judges generally, state
filings in Mexico would be far lower than their United States counterparts.
To this explanation must be added the broad scope of the amparo writ; that
is, the amparo as a general "writ of error," transforming mistaken interpre-
tations of state law into constitutional or "federal" questions. Federal courts
120. Based on a comparison of 52,000 amparos filed before the Mexican district
courts with a population in 1969 of 47,200,000, to 64,000 amparos with a population of
56,200,000 as of mid-1974. 2 EUROPA YEARBOOK: A WORLD SURVEY 941 (1969 ed.);
id. at 1034 (1975 ed.). For amparo filings in federal district courts, see INFORME . . .
1968 & 1974, supra note 41, annexes 1, 2.
121. INFORME . . . 1968 & 1974, supra note 41, annexes 1. 2.
122. Grossman & Sarat, supra note 16, at 336. This comparison is somewhat mis-
leading in that one type of case in the Mexican system is being compared with the aggre-
gate of all types of cases in the American system, but I believe the general proposition is
accurate.
123. 1975 CAL. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REP. 82. The method for determining litiga-
tion rate is the same employed in note 120 supra.
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in the United States possess no such legal authority over state courts. But
Anglo-American state judges do rule on federal constitutional rights ques-
tions, whereas Mexican state courts are expressly forbidden to do so.
Some have suggested that the amparo remedy is either the tool of the
upper classes against "revolutionary" and "antiproperty" government
policies, or so heavily concentrated in the urban areas that it is effectively
removed from popular usage. 2 4 Neither of these assertions, however, can
be substantiated. The first I have dealt with elsewhere125 and the latter will
be examined in the next section. But for now, surely the fact that criminal
suspects and prisoners filed more than 41,515 of the 64,500 amparo actions
commenced during 1974 in the district courts and that 1,670, or thirteen
percent, of all 1973 amparo complaints brought in the high Court against
administrative abuse came from communal farmers in land rights cases
indicates the accessibility of that proceeding to the "little man" or economi-
cally disadvantaged in Mexico.' 26 The second criticism can be rebutted by
perusal of the federal judiciary's annual report. It shows a remarkably even
spread in the number of cases filed and disposed of throughout all fifty-six of
the district judgeships, in both urban and rural areas of the country, includ-
ing the eight in the heavily populated federal district."17
The above analysis purports only to demonstrate the openness, accessi-
bility, and general popularity of the federal district courts as a major source
for controlling official violations of individual constitutional rights in
Mexico. Such accessibility is a reflection of the growing involvement of the
Mexican federal courts in individual rights cases.
The increasingly heavy use of the federal district courts and the am-
paro, however, has placed severe stress on the resources of these courts. In
1974 the backlog of cases pending in the district courts reached a new high
of 7,405 in criminal and civil matters, and 4,700 in administrative and labor
cases, out of 63,640 decided, a total residuum of more than 12,000 amparo
cases." This represents a twenty-one percent increase from 1969. There
124. Both suggestions have been made publicly in Mexico. See, e.g., P.
GONZALEZ CASANOVA, LA DEMOCRACIA EN MEXico 29-31 (2d ed. 1967) (primarily
criticizing the Supreme Court's provision of a haven to the propertied elite in agrarian
confiscation cases brought under the indirect amparo process).
125. See Schwarz, supra note 38, at 316-18.
126. See INFORME . .. 1974, supra note 41, annexes 1, 2; id. 1973, annex 2 bis.
127. Although beyond the time and space limitations of this article, future analysis
of such dispersion could incorporate Grossman and Sarat's method of statistically correlat-
ing federal litigation rates with levels of socio-economic and "political culture" develop-
ment of the various states in the United States. See Grossman & Sarat, supra note 116, at
328-42.
128. INFORME. . . 1974, supra note 41, annexes 1, 2.
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were 1,151 amparo cases filed, 1,136 terminated, and 216 pending per each
federal district judicial position (fifty-six in 1974). Similarly, the backlog of
civil cases in the United States district courts increased by just under
twenty-three percent between 1968 and 1973; but there were 253 pending
civil cases for every 246 filed and 246 terminated per authorized judgeship
by 1973.129
Professors Goldman and Jahnige suggest that the United States federal
courts and their allies in the legal and political systems prevent or inhibit
such "demand-input overload" through two important mechanisms: (1)
rules regulating the content and processing of litigation, and (2) structural
inhibitors, or "systemic gatekeepers," controlling such input by discretion-
ary application of their official prerogatives. 3 '
Examples of the first mechanism at the federal trial level are rules
restricting jurisdiction, justicability, and standing of the parties. The second
controlling mechanism, or "gatekeeper," includes lawyers for potential
litigants, law enforcement officials-especially the United States
attorneys-and judges. They all, according to the authors, "conspire" to
control the federal system's demand input by deciding which cases will be
heard. The most glaring example of how successful this collusion can be is
the huge proportion of civil cases (ninety percent) and criminal cases
(eighty-six percent) settled without trial.' 3 ' The Supreme Court has given
full sanction to this means of avoiding the judicial process, as well as
providing the ultimate gatekeeping function through its discretionary writ of
certiorari. 3'
This model of controlling "demand-input overload" is at least partially
applicable to the Mexican amparo system. Both mechanisms are used,
although in ways peculiar to the substantive provisions of the amparo law
and basic code of the federal judiciary. They also differ in their application
according to the idiosyncracies of the Mexican legal profession. Mexican
amparo judges at all levels have looked increasingly to the various grounds
for dismissing petitions, such as "inadmissibility," which may include
several reasons relating to improper procedure spelled out in the amparo
129. ANNUAL REPORT, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, UNITED STATES COURTS
117, Table 14 (1973).
130. GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 2, at 108, 131.
131. Id. at 114-15.
132. Id. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Supreme Court
gave its firmest support to the plea-bargaining system by reversing and remanding a con-
viction in which a new district attorney had failed to comply with prior sentencing re-
commendations made by agreement between the former prosecuting attorney and defen-
dant's counsel.
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code.133 Examples are the failure to state a clear cause of action, lack of
jurisdiction, blatantly incorrect procedure, and the lack of sufficient copies
of legal documents. Except for the last, all such causes are subject to broad
judicial discretion. Other bases for dismissal prior to a decision on the merits
are generally grouped with the former under the term "discontinuance";
here, however, the judge discovers some egregious error in the process of
considering the petition. 13 4 The most common ground is "expiration by
procedural inactivity" or failure to renew one's petition at three hundred-
day intervals after filing. 35 Long delays at the federal appellate level pro-
duced by case backlogs have made this ground for dismissal highly unpopu-
lar with the Mexican bar. The hostility of attorneys persuaded the Congress
to extend the renewal period in 1968, but resentment of even this rule
continues.
Increasing use of such rules in Mexico thus parallels the first part of
Goldman and Jahnige's model of how the United States federal courts con-
trol their demand overloads. Seventy-eight percent of the 63,640 cases
terminated in the Mexican federal district courts during 1974 were without a
decision on the substantive arguments presented; this compares with a
seventy-six percent rejection rate on such grounds in 1971.136 More than
33,000 of the 49,000 dismissals in 1974 occurred in response to petitions
from criminal suspects and convicts. 37 When Minister Ram6n Cafiedo Al-
drete of the Supreme Court recently tried to justify such practices, he re-
ferred to alleged abuses of the amparo by the legal profession and advised
the bar associations to take up the problem as a matter of professional
ethics. 38
Whenever lawyers advising their clients might actually respond to such
urging, their actions could be compared to the gatekeeping conspiracy
suggested by Goldman and Jahnige, but there is little empirical evidence to
support allegations of widespread collusion. The fact that amparo filings
continue to increase, especially in the district courts, demonstrates the per-
sistent saliency of the remedy for lawyers and clients alike. On the other
133. See LAW OF AMPARO art. 73.
134. Id. art. 74.
135. Id. art. 74(V) (as amended in 1968). My conclusions are based on interviews
with some forty attorneys in Mexico during the years 1968 through 1976.
136. Computed from figures in INFORME . . . 1971 & 1974, supra note 41, an-
nexes 1, 2.
137. INFORME ... 1974, supra note 41, annex 1.
138. Speech of September 18, 1973 (reported in INFORME . . . 1973, supra note
41, at 116-17, 119-20). In all fairness to the bar, Minister Cafiedo Aldrete also referred to
the increasing popularity of the amparo and the continued difficulties of the courts to
process incoming caseloads.
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hand, the parallel increase in dismissals may generate the ultimate pressure
on lawyers to bow before judicial demands for more careful scrutiny of the
complaints they receive.
Such practices mostly affect prospective litigants with grievances
against the system. In Mexico, further attempts to constrict caseloads
through esoteric and unpredictable procedures could drastically compound
inequities and obstacles already present for litigants in the legal system as a
whole. For example, good lawyers for any cause are expensive, and public
defenders in penal cases are atrociously paid and often lacking in ability.
Mexico has few counterparts to the nationwide resources and organizational
skills of the American Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP, The National
Welfare Rights Organization, the United Jewish Relief Fund, and more
localized but federally funded and well staffed pro bono units such as Cali-
fornia Rural Legal Assistance, the San Francisco Neighborhood Legal As-
sistance Foundation, and the Western Center on Law and Poverty. Together,
these groups have been instrumental in producing public interest case law
and administrative reform.'39 Nor does the enterprising pro bono lawyer in
Mexico, because of the relativity effect of amparo judgments,'14 have any
technical tool comparable to the frequently used class action suit in the
United States to right mass wrongs. 14
Mexico, nonetheless, has made impressive official efforts to cope with
problems of inadequate legal counsel for the poor and unorganized. The na-
tional penal, civil, labor, and agrarian codes provide special consideration
for the illiterate, indigent, or those ignorant of their legal rights in court.' 42 The
Law of Amparo itself, as pointed out previously, establishes several excep-
tions to technical rules of filing and petition content. These include the
power of the judge to supply the deficiency of the complaint for particular
classes of plaintiffs as well as to enable the same kinds of petitioners to
139. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Carlin, Store Front
Lawyers in San Francisco, in BEFORE THE LAW, 194-204 (J. Bonsignore ed. 1974).
140. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
141. Such suits have proliferated especially in the past ten years to settle the rights
and claims of literally thousands of "invisible litigants" in areas of civil rights, consumer
protection, protection of welfare recipients, and environmental quality. See Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological'Plaintiff, 116 U.
PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968). But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)
(greatly restricting monetary class actions by imposing notice costs on petitioner).
142. See, e.g., MEX. CIV. CODE arts. 17, 21. The latter provides: "Judges, con-
sidering the evident intellectual backwardness, remoteness from means of communication,
or miserable economic situation of some individuals, can, with approval of the Public
Minister, suspend the sanctions which these individuals might have incurred . . . or, if
possible, . . . concede them a period of time in which they may comply with the law
.... Boris Kozolchyk claims, however, that article 17 is seldom employed by
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avoid a number of technical filing requirements.143 In addition, local bar
associations and university law faculties provide limited free services to
indigents through organized programs, usually in the larger cities. Most
lawyers interviewed in Mexico felt that the two principal components of the
labor and agrarian sectors of the dominant political party, the Party of
Revolutionary Institutions (the National Confederation of Farmers and the
Mexican Confederation of Laborers) provided the most effective legal assis-
tance. The thousands of ampdro cases litigated by workers, unions, and
communal and small farmers within the labor and administrative chambers
of the Supreme Court seem to confirm this perception.
The amparo process in the federal district courts, then, appears to have
drawn a large and socially representative entourage. Social demands con-
tinue to increase despite some strenuous efforts by the federal judiciary and
Congress to inhibit the rate of litigation. The last section of this paper
evaluates the extent to which such widespread faith in the system is justified
by the actual dispositions of indirect amparo cases.
III. Decisional Independence and Libertarianism
in the Federal Trial Courts of the United
States and Mexico
A. Variants of Judicial Independence
Judicial independence and libertarianism will further the propensity of
courts to decide cases against the government in response to valid constitu-
tional claims. There are, to be sure, several indicators or variables of judicial
independence and libertarianism that present fertile fields for further re-
search. The preceding section of this article, for example, comprised a
review of the general accessibility of amparo courts and the willingness of a
vast number of individuals to seek such forums when aggrieved by official
action.
There are many other indicators as well. First, it would be useful to
determine the extent to which lower courts and nonjudicial agencies actually
enforce politically significant or unpopular constitutional rights decisions.
Evidence of compliance problems abounds in the Mexican amparo courts.
For example, a hundred or so allegations of noncompliance are filed in the
Supreme Court each year by victorious plaintiffs frustrated by target au-
Mexico's appellate courts. Kozolchyk, Trends in Comparative Legal Research: Appropos
Dainaw's The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and in Mixed Juris-
dictions, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 100, 107 (1976).
143. See notes 29-32 supra.
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thorities' unwillingness to comply fully with the terms of the judgment. 144
Second, a general theory of judicial impact more appropriate to cross-
national comparison 141 could also help determine the degree to which liber-
tarian decisions and the Supreme Courts themselves are accepted and fol-
lowed by a separate, "pro-Court" constituency. Such a following might
include key politicians, bar associations, other judges and judicial confer-
ences, law faculties, journalists, and public opinion in general. There is
evidence to support both sides of the question as it relates to the public
image of the Mexican federal courts.146
Third, an examination of the budgetary process and allotments to the
national court systems might help to explain the hidden linkages between the
judiciary and the political branches of government. Examination of the
budgetary process could reveal the extent to which the key groups men-
tioned above actually lobby or influence the budgetary process on behalf of
an independent judiciary. It might also indicate to what extent courts are in
effect rewarded for service to national executive policy. Such scrutiny
would have particular utility in analyzing the political ties of judges to other
elite groups in the developing or transitional societies of Latin America and
Africa. It would be interesting to explore further, for example, the fact that
in 1973 the Mexican federal courts received .0081 per cent of the total
budget, while the United States federal judiciary accounted for .0007 per-
cent. 147 Furthermore, the President of the Mexican Court rejoiced over a
thirty-six percent annual increase in the 1975 budget allocations for the
federal courts.148
144. See INFORME . .. 1973 & 1974, supra note 41, annexes 10.
145. For studies representative of the rapidly developing literature on Anglo-
American "judicial impact," see, e.g., COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW: A MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY APPROACH (S. Kirsolv ed. 1972); K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE
SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE (1971); THE
IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2d ed. T. Becker & M. Feely eds. 1973); N.
MILNER, THE COURT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: IMPACT OF MIRANDA (1971); S.
WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPEC-
TIVES (1970); Levine & Becker, Toward and Beyond a Theory of Supreme Court Impact,
13 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 485, 561 (1970); Levine, An Empirical Approach to Civil
Liberties: The Bookseller and Obscenity Law, 1969 WiS. L. REV. 153.
Except for suggestions in the Levine & Becker article, none of the above sources
attempts to apply impact analysis to comparative studies. See Clark. The Impact Study: A
Friendly Evaluation of the State of the Art (paper delivered at Midwest Political Science
Association Conference in Chicago, May 30, 1973).
146. See Schwarz, supra note 38, at 329 n.335.
147. INFORME . . . 1973, supra note 41, at 29-30; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, STASTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 233 (1974).
148. INFORME. . . 1974, supra note 41, at 31.
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Fourth, it would be profitable to examine the frequency and intensity
with which legislatures or chief executives react, if at all, against particular
courts or judicial decisions. There has been insufficient study of the extent of
attempts to curb court jurisidiction through constitutional amendment, legis-
lative enactment or, particularly in Latin America, executive declarations of
states of siege and other kinds of national emergencies."'
A fifth variable affecting judicial 'independence would be judges'
socio-economic and political backgrounds as they correlate with the kinds of
decisions judges make and their individual attitudes toward the role of tle
courts and constitutional law generally. Professor H. Fix Zamudio calls this
aspect of independence "the dignity of the judicial career," particularly as
confirmed through the actions and tenure laws of the other governing
branches.150 In a recent seminal work on the comparative consequences of
elective as opposed to appointive judicial selection methods in two states,15
the authors concluded by stressing "the implications of these data [on the
backgrounds of appellate court judges in California and Iowa] for
decision-making propensities, for differential judicial role conceptions, and
for broader conceptions of regime or system stability.' '152
B. Measurements of Decisional Independence: United States Habeas Corpus
and Section 1983 Actions v. Indirect Amparo Decisions
A final and admittedly more easily measurable criterion of judicial
indepencence, given sufficient official data, can be found in the number and
proportion of actual decisions judges make or fail to make on individual
rights complaints filed against the government. This decisional approach
will now be applied to the constitutional rights dispositions of the federal
district courts of the United States and Mexico.153
149. See, e.g., Fouts, Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960,
in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 257, 286-87 (G. Schubert & D. Danelski eds.
1969) (regarding the need for research into various "external influences on the Supreme
Court"). See also BAKER, supra note 23, on the potentially great but rarely exercised
power of Congress to restrict the Mexican Court's jurisdiction or reverse established deci-
sions under the amending clause (article 135) of the Constitution.
150. H. FIX ZAMUDIO, CONSTITUCION Y PROCESO CIVIL EN LATINOAMERICA
41-43 (1974).
151. Berg, Green, Schmidhauser & Schneider, The Consequences of Judicial Re-
form: A Comparative Analysis of the California and Iowa Appellate Systems, 28 W. POL.
Q. 263 (1975).
152. Id. at 278.
153. See Schwarz, supra note 38, at 286. This analysis has certain inherent
shortcomings that should be noted at the outset: (1) My comparisons will not consider
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To provide some correlative measure of judicial independence in the
two nations' federal trial courts, I have chosen to compare the dispositions
of habeas corpus petitions154 and complaints under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act.55 with the decisions of the Mexican district judges on indirect
amparos brought in penal and administrative cases. The indirect amparo in
criminal matters approximates the United States habeas corpus proceeding
in that both are employed mainly by criminal suspects, defendants, and
convicts seeking relief while under some form of detention. Both, in addi-
tion, must address specific violations of constitutional rights. The writ of
habeas corpus at the district court level, however, is dissimilar to its amparo
counterpart in that it primarily provides a means of post-conviction relief for
state and federal prisoners. Pursuant to the Mexican anmparo law, as has
been noted,' 56 federal trial courts intervene in such trial and appellate pro-
ceedings only under emergency or imminent danger circumstances. Con-
stitutional challenges to sentences and convictions as finalized on appeal
occur almost exclusively through the direct amparo brought in the circuit
courts or the Supreme Court.
The following comparative data nonetheless point to the common de-
nominators of federal habeas corpus and indirect amparo petitions. Both
writs rest on alleged violations of the most fundamental of constitutional
rights, freedom from arbitrary confinement. Further, it is this category of
constitutional rights litigation that recently has generated explosive increases
in the judicial caseloads in both countries. Finally, they both involve ex-
peditious, simplified, and inexpensive evidentiary proceedings relative to
other extraordinary or appellate remedies in criminal cases and are sought
primarily for those reasons.
A more accurate cross-national comparison with the indirect amparo in
both penal and administrative law cases can be gained by quantifying the
proportion of cases won and lost by plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief,
monetary damages, or both under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.
differences in judicial style between the Mexican and Anglo-American legal systems that
arise from preferences for certain types of constitutional claims or from deference to the
institutions being challenged; (2) The win-loss scheme utilized in the course of this
analysis is incapable bf weighting individual decisions on the basis of either speed of dis-
position or relative political significance; (3) As will be noted elsewhere, the sources for
my data are both incomplete and inadequate. One result of this analysis is that it graphi-
cally illustrates the pressing need for fuller and more accessible compilation and tabulation
of accurate information and dispositions of cases by lower national courts both in the
United States and throughout the world.
154. 28 U.S.C. ch. 153 (1970).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
156. See text accompanying notes 82-113 supra.
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Judging from the selectively reported district court opinions in the Federal
Supplement, section 1983 actions outnumbered the habeas corpus cases by
roughly three to one in 1974. Furthermore, section 1983 litigation encom-
passes a much greater range of official abuses against constitutionally pro-
tected civil rights. These include everything from prisoner complaints about
the conditions of confinement to zoning and election code inequalities,
police harassment of political demonstrators, bureaucratic abuses of eligible
welfare recipients, and racial discrimination by school boards and other
public employers. The wording of section 1983 indicates the breadth of its
protective coverage:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for re-
dress. 15
7
My own sample of 374 actions under section 1983 reported in the Federal
Supplement for 1974 revealed that fewer than twenty-three percent (eighty-
seven) were brought by state or federal prisoners; a much smaller number
(twenty-eight cases) dealt with complaints and damage suits against law
enforcement officials in other criminal related matters. Furthermore, unlike
standing requirements in habeas corpus litigation, section 1983 actions are
not limited to those detained in some way. Nor is there a requirement of any
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, not even if the governing stat-
ute provides adequate recourse for the civil rights complaint.' 58 In these
respects, then, section 1983 is closer than the federal habeas corpus statute
to the indirect amparo injunction against irreparable injury suffered at the
hands of either the abusive bureaucrat or the criminal law enforcement
official. 5 9
The main limitation in comparing the section 1983 action to the indirect
amparo is its singular application to state criminal and administrative ac-
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
158. For section 1983 cases where exhaustion of state judicial remedies prior to the
filing of a federal suit was not required, see Zwickler v. Koota, 390 U.S. 611 (1967);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). In Monroe v. Pape,3- 365 U.S. 167
(1961), no exhaustion was required, even where these remedies were "adequate" but
possibly not "available." Id. at 174. State administrative remedies were held not to re-
quire exhaustion in Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) and McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
159. See text accompanying notes 89-107 supra for a general comparison of the
indirect amparo with the federal writ of habeas corpus.
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HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tions. '" Thus the need arises to incorporate the federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding into the comparative reference. As the only extraordinary writ ex-
pressly designated by the Constitution, habeas corpus applies to both state
and federal authorities. 6 '
Based on these considerations, the foregoing table renders a composite
portrait of win-loss ratios for constitutional rights claimants challenging
similar kinds of official abuses in the Mexican and United States federal
district courts.
The foregoing data prevent wholly accurate comparisons because of the
following deficiencies. As the notes to the table indicate, there is little
systematic, centralized information on the disposition of cases by subject
matter in the United States district courts or courts of appeals. My own
reliance on the Federal Supplement, of course, presents its own problems of
distortion. The Federal Supplement reports only those cases deemed impor-
tant by the judges of each district. It also primarily records decisions on the
merits and omits an unknown number of petitions dismissed as frivolous or
procedurally and technically defective. Thus, absent evidence to the con-
trary, one might assume that United States district courts dismiss constitu-
tional rights petitions at a rate similar to or even greater than rejections of
amparo complaints by the Mexican trial courts. To help neutralize these data
in comparing win-loss ratios, Table III eliminates the eighty percent of the
cases dismissed by the Mexican district courts and compares wins and losses
in both national trial court systems exclusively in terms of decisions on the
merits. This represents a broad sample of section 1983 cases from the 1974
volumes of the Federal Supplement as contrasted with amparo cases duly
recorded as conceded or denied to the plaintiffs in both the administrative
and criminal law areas.
C. A General Evaluation of Decisional Independence Data
The data outlined opposite are still very inadequate as a rigorous statisti-
cal method for quantifying judicial independence and libertarian decision
making. The data on United States lower court dispositions continue to be
incomplete or practically inaccessible. The Mexican annual summaries of
amparo dispositions in the Supreme Court's Informe do not specify the
kinds of penal and administrative constitutional rights cases decided in the
federal district courts. Nor does the annual report weigh those cases accord-
160. But it also applies to all United States territories. See the wording of section
1983 quoted in the text accompanying note 157 supra.
161. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9. For a sweeping reaffirmation of habeas corpus as
"both the symbol and guardian of individual liberty" in England and the United States,
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HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
ing to any degree of quantitative (e.g., time-consuming) or qualitative
(policy-content) importance. Furthermore, Mexico provides no common
reporter for lower court decisions or opinions as a counterpart to the admit-
tedly incomplete and selective Federal Supplement in the United States.
A more fundamental question presents itself: even if systematic, reli-
able figures were readily obtainable, what would they show? Summaries of
judicial output may reflect the formal response of individual judges to indi-
vidual constitutional rights claims. But they cannot fully reveal the alterna-
tive, yet substantive, efforts those same judges and other officials might
make to address the human problems represented by the petitions against
government abuse. Three examples should suffice. Reacting to the high
influx of prisoners petitions in Iowa, the United States district court in Des
Moines has begun to refer a large number of such complaints about prison
conditions to the state Citizens' Aid Office "because it is felt that the Deputy
for Corrections might solve some of the problems more expeditiously.'"'12
Thus, ombudsmen, legal aid societies, complaint-oriented administrators,
legislators, and other agencies, both private and public, may well be closely
linked to the judge's perception of the individual petitioner's problem and its
eventual, nonjudicial solution.
The actions of Chief Judge John Oliver in the remarkable section 1983
case of Glenn v. Wilkinson6 3 provides another example. A state prisoner in
Missouri challenged the "filthy" and "pig-sty" conditions of his segregated
confinement in a death row cell. He asserted that his jail environment,
without running water, religious contacts, or the barest of living and medical
necessities, constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment.' Though eventually dismissing the complaint as not
involving a federally protected right, Judge Oliver nonetheless instructed the
defendant correctional officers to respond to the complaint at a separate
evidentiary hearing, with a view toward the issues.'65 Accordingly, most of
the problems related in Glenn's brief eventually were corrected. To
dramatize his point, Judge Oliver appended to his opinion a long compara-
tive survey of prison conditions for death sentence prisoners in thirty-four
jurisdictions.' 66 The survey, prepared by his clerk and Glenn's defense
162. THE IOWA CITIZENS' AIDE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF IOWA AND
THE 65TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY (January 1-December 31, 1973). I am grateful to Pro-
fessor Stanley Anderson at the University of California, Santa Barbara, for contributing
this information and for his ideas on "alternative complaint handling procedures" for
constitutional rights cases.
163. 309 F. Supp. 411 (1970).
164. Id. at 412.
165. Id. at 415.
166. Id. at 418-20.
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counsel, indicated the widely variant quality of prison conditions throughout
the country.
A third example is the recent and successful effort to settle out of court
thousands of pending agrarian rights cases in Mexico. A coordinating com-
mission comprised jointly of representatives from the Secretariat of Agrarian
Reform and the Supreme Court, and aided by a Technical Agency of Con-
ciliators, has resolved almost 2,000 claims by some 195,000 small farmers
against confiscatory actions of the national government. The Secretariat of
Agrarian Reform estimates that such a procedure has effectively eliminated
about seventy-five percent of the backlog of land rights amparo petitions
pending in the federal judiciary. 6
Thus the denial of Mr. Glenn's petition, the district court's referral of
prisoner petitions to the Iowa Citizens' Aid Office, and the Mexican Su-
preme Court's eventual "dismissal" of agrarian amparo cases resolved
through extra-judicial means in no way indicated the eventual results of the
cases. Federal judges often deny petitions on the merits, while still retaining
jurisdiction until the matter is resolved by another agency or court. Disposi-
tional data, then, can only provide a clue, though an important one, about
one of the major ways judges may respond to particular sets of cir-
cumstances surrounding constitutional rights issues.
Nevertheless, the preceding statistical exposition does provide one
startling conclusion: coupled with a high degree of accessibility, the Mexi-
can district courts exhibit a distinct pattern of independence against chal-
lenged government abuse. It will require much more investigation of the
content of those anti-government judgments and their subsequent enforce-
ment before their full political import can be determined with precision. But
one point seems clear: the thousands of cases won by amparo plaintiffs and
the great volume of litigated cases each year indicate that the Mexican trial
courts and their Anglo-American counterparts are important institutions for
allocating values, scarce resources, and sanctions in the national political
system. Certainly, their primary roles in deciding constitutional rights cases
can no longer be ignored by scholars in the United States.
167. See Excelsior (Mexico City), Nov. 11, 1975, at 22-A. Mexico has several
other nonjudicial institutions for resolving various kinds of citizen complaints, including:
(1) The Federal Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration in labor-management conflicts
(Juntas Federales de Conciliaci6n y Arbitraje); (2) Federal Fiscal Tribunal (Tribunal Fis-
cal de la Federacidn); (3) State fiscal tribunals in Veracruz and Mexico; (4) Administra-
tive Tribunal for the Federal District (Tribunal de lo Contencioso-Administrativo del Dis-
trito Federal); (5) The Coordinative Commission of the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform-
Supreme Court of Justice; (6) The Committee and then Commission for Regulating Land
Tenancy (Comitg Conisi6n para la Regularizaci6n de la Tenancia de la Tierra); (7) The
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Federal Agency for the Consumer and the National Consumer Institute (Procuraduria
Federal del Consumidor y el Instituto Nacional del Consumidor). See Schwarz, Recursos
no-judiciales contra abusos administrativos: la experiencia me.icana, BOLETIN DEL
IDUR No. 7, at 31-53 (Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano y Regional 1976).
